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Abstract 
The EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for CO2-emissions from energy 
and industry installations reflects a paradigm shift towards market-based in-
struments for environmental policy in the EU. The centerpieces of the EU ETS 
are National Allocation Plans (NAPs), which individual Member States (MS) de-
sign for each phase. NAPs state the total quantity of allowances available in 
each period (ET-budget) and determine how MS allocate allowances to individ-
ual installations. The NAPs thus govern investments and innovation in energy 
efficient technologies and the energy sector. In terms of distribution, they prede-
termine winners and losers.  
In this paper we analyze and evaluate 25 NAPs submitted to the European 
Commission (EC) for phase 2 (2008-2012) of the EU ETS. At the macro level, 
we assess whether the submitted ET-budgets are stringent, and whether they 
imply a cost-efficient split of the required emission reductions between the EU 
ETS sectors (energy and industry) and the remaining sectors (transportation, 
tertiary and households). Comparing the submitted ET-budgets with those al-
ready approved by the EC suggests that the EC’s decisions significantly im-
proved the effectiveness and economic efficiency of the EU ETS. But given the 
high share of Kyoto Mechanisms companies are allowed to use, the EU ETS is 
unlikely to require substantial emission reductions within the EU.  
At the micro level, we assess (across countries and phases) the allocation 
methods for existing and new installations, for closures and for clean technolo-
gies. A comparison of the NAPs for the second phase and the first phase (2005-
2007) provides insights into the (limited) adaptability and flexibility of the 
scheme. The findings provide guidance for the future design of the EU ETS and 
applications to other sectors and regions. 
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1 Introduction1 
As the EU’s key climate policy instrument, the EU Emission Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) for large CO2-emitting installations in the energy and industry sectors 
is expected to help the EU and the EU Member States (MS) reach their short- 
and long-term greenhouse gas emissions targets in a cost-efficient way. The 
start of the EU ETS in 2005 may also reflect a shift in environmental policy from 
command-and-control type environmental regulation, such as setting technolo-
gy standards, towards market-based instruments. The latter instruments induce 
demand for innovative, energy/carbon saving processes, products and services 
because the costs of reducing emissions will eventually be reflected in the mar-
ket price for EU emission allowances (EUA). This increased demand should in 
turn lead to more research and development, and the invention, adoption and 
market diffusion of such innovations. The extent of the technological change 
induced by the EU ETS crucially depends on the scheme's design (Gagelmann, 
Frondel 2005; Schleich, Betz 2005). In general, this is governed by the EU E-
mission Trading Directive 2003/87/EC (CEC 2003) and country-specific design 
features are determined by the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) of the indivi-
dual MS for each trading period. The first trading period of the EU ETS is from 
2005 to 2007 (phase 1); the second trading period (phase 2) coincides with the 
Kyoto commitment period from 2008-2012. At the macro level, NAPs state the 
total quantity of allowances available in each period (ET-budget); at the micro 
level, they determine how these allowances will be allocated to individual instal-
lations. Thus, at the macro level, the NAPs determine to what extent the indivi-
dual MS may rely on the EU ETS to achieve their emission targets. In particular, 
the NAPs establish how to “split the pie”: How many allowances should be allo-
cated to the installations covered by the EU ETS trading sectors (i.e. from ener-
gy and industry sectors), and which emission reductions are expected from the 
household, services and transport sectors, which are not covered by the EU 
ETS (non-trading sectors)? The combined emission budgets for trading and 
non-trading sectors also determine to what extent MS rely on domestic efforts 
                                            
1  Senior authorship is shared. The authors would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for 
helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. Research assistance by Johanna 
Cludius, Jakob Rager, Manuel Strauch and Saskia Ziemann is gratefully acknowledged. 
Part of this research was completed while Joachim Schleich was also a visiting professor 
at the Université Louis Pasteur, Strasbourg, France.   
This paper has been accepted for publication as: Schleich, J., Betz, R., and Rogge, K. 
(2007): EU Emissions Trading – better job second time around? In: European Council for 
Energy-Efficient Economy (Paris): Proceedings of the 2007 eceee Summer Study. Saving 
energy – just do it! La Colle sur Loup, Côte d’Azur, France, 4 – 9 June 2007. 
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and to what extent on the Flexible Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol to meet 
their emissions targets, i.e. International Emission Trading, the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI).  
The size of the ET-budget at the macro level of the NAPs indicates whether the 
EU ETS is environmentally effective in terms of reducing CO2-emissions. The 
allocation rules specified at the micro level for existing and new installations and 
for closures shape incentives for innovation and long-term investments in low-
carbon energy technologies and in energy-efficiency in the industry sectors. In 
terms of distribution, the micro plan also predetermines the winners and losers 
of emission trading. All NAPs need to be approved by the EC based on the cri-
teria specified in Annex III of the Emission Trading Directive (CEC 2003) and in 
the NAP guidance (CEC 2004a; CEC 2005). 
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive first analysis and evaluation of the 
NAPs of all 25 MS and thus significantly extend and update prior work by the 
same authors (Betz et al. 2006). The NAPs of Romania and Bulgaria were exc-
luded as they face special circumstances due to joining the EU in 2007. The 
total proposed budget of the 25 NAPs studied is approx. 2,179 million t of CO2e 
p.a. (one EUA corresponds to one tonne of CO2e). On 29 November 2006 the 
EC published its assessment of a first group of NAPs from 10 MS, and on 16 
January 2007 for a second group of 2 MS. The EC issued two additional NAP 
decisions for Slovenia and Spain on February 5, 2007 and February 26, 2007, 
respectively. In addition, we consider the resubmitted NAP of France as “quasi-
approved” by the Commission2 – making a total of 15 “approved” NAPs. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 consists of the macro-level 
analysis which presents our evaluations on the stringency of the ET-budgets 
using historical emissions in 2005, the size of the ET-budgets in phase 1 and 
projected emissions in 2010 as benchmarks. We also appraise the split of the 
required emission reductions between the ET-sectors and the remaining sectors 
(including non-CO2 sources) from a cost-efficiency perspective. In particular, we 
assess the impact of the EC’s assessments of the NAPS in terms of these four 
criteria. Section 3 includes the micro-level analysis and assesses the allocation 
                                            
2  We are including the figures from France’s resubmitted NAP as ”quasi-accepted” by the 
EC, and compare these with figures from France’s originally submitted NAP, since France 
has applied the criteria published in the EC’s first NAP II decision on November 29, 2006 
for its revised NAP. Also, allocation data and rules of the revised German NAP (of 13 
February 2007) are used. 
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rules for existing and new installations, for closures and for clean technologies 
based on insights from economic theory. We also survey provisions for combi-
ned heat and power (CHP) plants, early action and process-related emissions. 
The rules at the micro-level are also compared to those applied in phase 1. A 
summary table in the Annex provides a comprehensive overview of the micro 
plans. Finally, the concluding Section 4 briefly summarizes the main results, 
points to areas of improved harmonization and efficiency and offers guidance 
for the future design of the EU ETS and its possible application to other sectors 
and regions. 
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2 Macro-level analysis of National Allocation Plans 
Since the ET-budgets set by MS are key for the ET-sectors’ contribution to re-
ducing greenhouse gas emissions the EC took a close look at the proposed ET-
budgets. On 29 November 2006 the EC published its first decision on the NAPs 
of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, and on January 16, 2007 its decision on the 
NAPs of Belgium and the Netherlands. As stated above the EC issued two addi-
tional NAP decisions for Slovenia and Spain on February 5, 2007 and February 
26, 2007, respectively. In this paper, when assessing the stringency of the 
NAPs, we will compare macro figures from notified NAPs with figures taken 
from the Commission’s NAP decisions. 
2.1 Progress towards Kyoto: Distance-to-target and 
supplementarity analysis 
As of 2004, apart from the new MS, which are - with the only exception of Slo-
venia - clearly on a path towards reaching their Kyoto emission targets, only 
France, Greece, Sweden, and the UK appear to be on target, while most other 
EU-15 MS will need to make substantial additional efforts to meet their targets 
(see UNFCCC 2006; EEA 2006). Of course, the distance-to-target situation im-
proves for MS intending to use Kyoto Mechanisms (KM), i.e. for Austria, Belgi-
um, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain and Sweden. 3 In total, the 11 EU-15 MS intend to purchase CERs, E-
RUs or AAUs for emissions of approx. 109 MtCO2e/a, which represents a share 
of 7.3 % of the Assigned Amount of these EU-15 MS (see Table 2).  
In addition, the Linking Directive (CEC 2004b) allows companies to use credits 
from projects under Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean Development Me-
chanism (CDM) to cover their emissions under the EU ETS (see Table 1 and 2). 
In line with the Linking Directive, MS specified the use of these KM by compa-
nies as a percentage of allocation in their NAPs (KM limit) (Article 5, CEC 
2004b). These limits differ substantially across countries and range from 0 % in 
Malta to 70 % for public service electricity generation in Spain (only 20 % for 
remaining sectors). Based on the supplementarity requirements of the Marra-
kesh Accords and the Kyoto Protocol, the EU ETS Directive requires that the 
                                            
3  Intended governmental use of Kyoto Mechanisms (in MtCO2e/a): Austria 9, Belgium 7, 
Denmark 4.2, Finland 2.4, Ireland 3.6, Italy 19, Luxembourg 4.7, the Netherlands 20, Por-
tugal 5.8, Spain 31.8 and Sweden 1.1. 
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use of KM must be supplemental to domestic action (see Article 30.3, CEC 
2004b). For its NAP assessment, the EC has developed a new quantitative cri-
terion to assess the conformity of the KM limit for companies with supplementa-
rity principles. The maximum overall amount of credits from JI/CDM projects 
that a Member State can make use of is half of the amount of reduction it is re-
quired to undertake in relation to either base year emissions, greenhouse gas 
emissions in 2004, or projected emissions in 2010, whichever of the three is 
highest. The amount of JI/CDM credits that can be used by EU ETS installati-
ons in that Member State is reduced by the annual average amount of intended 
or substantiated government purchases (CEC 2006a, p. 9). In order to stimulate 
demand in JI and CDM, the EC grants operators a minimum level of 10% of the 
allocation – regardless of quantitative supplementarity requirements (CEC 
2006a; CEC 2007a, b, c). Since companies may trade credits from JI or CDM-
projects for EUAs, restrictions imposed by individual MS on the use of these 
credits will only be binding at the aggregate level: In the 25 MS analyzed in this 
paper, the total use of KM would be approx. 373.1 MtCO2e/a.4 Since the EC 
imposed restrictions on the size of the ET-budgets (for 12 out of 14 MS, see 
below) and on the use of KM, this figure has so far dropped to 
352.3 MtCO2e/a. 5
Table 1 depicts the sum of companies' maximum use and governments' inten-
ded purchases of KM being approx. 482.1 Mt CO2e/a, a figure that decreases 
when considering the EC assessments. This figure relates to a distance-to-
target (DTT as of 2004) of all 25 MS examined of some 21 Mt CO2e/a only, 
which clearly shows that – EU-wide – there would be no need for additional 
domestic reductions at all. Of course, there are substantial differences between 
EU-15 and EU-10 MS (DTT of -306 vs. 285 Mt CO2e/a) as well as across MS.  
                                            
4  This figure already includes the increase of the KM limit for German companies from 12 % 
to now 20 %. 
5  Approved (and, if different, originally planned) shares for the use of KM are (in %): Belgium 
8.3, Germany 20 (originally 12), Greece 9, Ireland 21.9 (50), Latvia 5, Lithuania 8.9, Lu-
xembourg 10, Malta 0, the Netherlands 10 (12 %), Slovenia 15.8 (17.8), Slovakia 7, Spain 
13.2 (70/20), Sweden 10 (20), UK 8. KM limits (in %) of not yet approved NAPs include 
Austria 20, Cyprus 10, Czech Republic 10, Denmark 19, Estonia N.A., Finland (average of) 
15.2, France 10, Hungary 10, Italy 25, Poland 25, Portugal 10. 
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Table 1: Notified and accepted use of Kyoto mechanism by governments 
and companies 
Governmental use of KM Permitted company use of KM Sum of max. KM use
in million ERU and CER / a
EU-25 (25) Notified 108.9 373.1 482.1
(15) Accepted 67.3 167.4 234.8  
Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on NAPs of MS, CEC 2006a, and CEC 2007a, CEC 2007b, CEC 
2007c 
2.2 Stringency of national ET-budgets 
Verified emissions data for 2005 (CEC 2006c) revealed that only very few 
countries allocated quantities of EUA in 2005 which are below the actual 2005 
emission levels of the ET-sector (Austria, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain and the 
UK). As a consequence of this allowance surplus of about 44 million EUA for 
2005, in May 2006 prices for EUA plummeted from around € 26/EUA to around 
€ 10/EUA and are now (January 2007) at € 5/EUA. Scarcity, however, is a pre-
requisite for a well-functioning market, i.e. without scarcity, the existence of the 
EU ETS would be hard to justify. As a consequence the Commission has deve-
loped its own criterion, which is based on 2005 verified emission data, econo-
mic growth and carbon intensity trends (CEC 2006a, p. 3ff.). Applying this crite-
rion has led the EC to require budget cuts in all but two of the assessed plans 
(the UK and Slovenia).  
Figure 1 shows these cuts in ETS budgets for phase 2 in absolute and relative 
terms. The largest reduction in absolute terms is required of Germany with al-
most 29 million EUA/a (compared to its NAP II budget of 482 million EUA/a, not 
the later proposal of 465 million EUA/a), while the largest cut in relative terms 
applies to Latvia with almost 58 %. In total, the EC reduced the phase 2 bud-
gets of these 15 MS by approx. 134 million EUA or -9.6%. Of these, -110 million 
EUA/a were requested of EU-15 MS (corresponding to a reduction of -8.4 %), 
while -23 million EUA/a can be attributed to the new MS (representing a cut of  
-30.5 %). 
EU Emission Trading – Better Job Second Time Around? 7 
 
Figure 1: ET-budget cuts demanded by the EU Commission for phase 
2 (in MtCO2e/a and %) 
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Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on NAPs of MS, CEC 2006a and CEC 2007a, CEC 2007b, CEC 
2007c  
 
To assess the stringency of the ET-budgets for phase 2 we compare those with 
verified emissions for 2005 (criterion 1), the size of ET-budgets in phase 2 (cri-
terion 2) and the projected emissions for 2010. Since the type and number of 
installations participating in the EU ETS differs between both phases – e.g. as a 
consequence of the EC’s attempt to harmonise the coverage of installations, or 
because some MS decided to opt out installations in phase 1 – adjustments had 
to be made for a meaningful comparison. 6 We also show the impact of the 
EC’s assessment by applying the criteria to both the notified ET-budgets and to 
the ET-budgets allowed by the EC. 
Criterion 1: Second phase ET-budgets (without reserve for new entrants) 
compared to verified emissions for 2005 
The results of the comparison of phase 2 ET-budgets (without NER) with veri-
fied emissions for 2005 are shown (in %) in Figure 2. A positive value indicates 
that the ET-budget for phase 2 is larger than 2005 verified emissions of the ET-
                                            
6  For a detailed description on the methodology see Rogge et al. (2006). 
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sector, a negative result shows that the ET-budget is set below 2005 emission 
levels. On the left-hand side, EU-15 MS are depicted, on the right-hand side 
EU-10 MS. In general, while EU-15 MS tend to pass this criterion (except for 
Finland, France, Luxembourg and Sweden), especially after the budget cuts 
demanded by the EC (striped bars), the new EU-10 MS – with the exception of 
Slovenia – fail this test which means that installations are granted room for 
growth. 7  
Since the EC did not provide any information, - we assumed the EC’s decision 
would result in a proportional cut of the ET-budgets and the NERs. Of course, 
MS may decide otherwise, in particular Latvia and Malta, where – because their 
proposed NERs were relatively large – a proportional reduction would imply 
substantial shortage of EUAs for existing installations. 
Figure 2: ET-budgets for phase 2 and COM adjusted budgets com-
pared to emissions in 2005 (in %) 
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1- Emissions 2005 / ET-budget phase 2 1- Emissions 2005 / ET-budget phase 2 (COM decision) 
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - VET 2005 EU-15 (10 only):  -176.6 Mt CO2e/a  (-15.0 %)
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - VET 2005 EU-10 (5 only):          1.8 Mt CO2e/a     (3.6 %)
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - VET 2005 EU-25 (15 only):   -174.8 Mt CO2e/a  (-14.2 %)
 
Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on NAPs of MS, CEC 2006a, CEC 2006b, CEC 2007a, CEC 
2007b, CEC 2007c, registry data (CITL as of October 23, 2006), UNFCCC 2006 and EEA 2006 
 
                                            
7  As registry data for Poland still only covers less than 60 % of the cap set in Poland’s first 
NAP, data from the verified emissions tables (VET) for 2005 for Poland is estimated and 
thus needs to be interpreted with caution (for details see Rogge et al. 2006).  
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Criterion 2: Second phase ET-budgets compared to first phase ET-
budgets (including NERs) 
A MS is said to fulfil this criterion if its adjusted ET-budget for phase 2 is lower 
than the ET-budget for phase 1. Figure 3 presents the results of this assess-
ment, including changes due to budget reductions required by the EC (striped 
bars).  
Figure 3: ET-budgets for phase 2 and COM adjusted budgets compared 
to ET-budgets in phase 1 (in %) 
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2- ET-budget phase 1 / ET-budget phase 2 2- ET-budget phase 1 / ET-budget phase 2 (COM decision)
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - ET-budget 1 EU-15 (10 only):   -153.0 Mt CO2e/a  (-12.3 %)
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - ET-budget 1 EU-10 (5 only):         -7.0 Mt CO2e/a  (-13.2 %)
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - ET-budget 1 EU-25 (15 only):   -160.0 Mt CO2e/a  (-12.3 %)
 
Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on NAPs of MS, CEC 2006a, CEC 2006b, CEC 2007a, CEC 
2007b, CEC2007c, registry data (CITL as of October 23, 2006), UNFCCC 2006 and EEA 2006 
In the EU-15, all MS except for Luxembourg and Greece reduced their ET-
budget for phase 2 below the budget in the pilot phase 2005-07. In contrast, all 
EU-10 MS – again with the exception of Slovenia – notified ET-budgets for pha-
se 2 that exceed ET-budgets in the current phase. A look at the striped bars 
shows that the budget cuts required by the EC lead to a situation where all 
countries fulfil criterion 2. 
Criterion 3: Second phase ET-budgets (including NERs) compared to pro-
jected emissions for 2010 
This criterion is considered to be met if the ET-budget for phase 2 is lower than 
the projected emissions for 2010, i.e. the figures shown in Figure 4 are negati-
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ve. Again, our assessment for the EU-15 MS differs substantially from our as-
sessment for the new MS when looking at notified NAP data. While EU-15 MS 
choose an ET-budget that is lower than projections (with the exceptions of 
France, Germany and Portugal), most new MS intend to allocate more than or 
the same as projected emissions (with the exceptions of Lithuania - whose pro-
jection is rather high - and Slovenia). Again, the decisions undertaken by the EC 
lead to a situation where all countries meet criterion 3. 
Figure 4: ET-budgets for phase 2 and COM adjusted budgets compared 
to projection for 2010 (in %) 
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3- Projection 2010 / ET-budget phase 2 3- Projection 2010 / ET-budget phase 2  (COM decision)
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - Projection 2010 EU-15 (10 only):        -150.8 Mt CO2e/a  (-12.1 %)
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - Projection 2010 EU-10 (5 only):           - 20.4 Mt CO2e/a  (-38.1 %)
∑ ET-budget 2 (COM) - Projection 2010 EU-25 (15 only):        -171.1 Mt CO2e/a  (-13.2 %)
 
Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on NAPs of MS, CEC 2006a, CEC 2006b, CEC 2007a, CEC 
2007b, CEC 2007c, registry data (CITL as of October 23), 2006, UNFCCC 2006 and EEA 2006 
Overall, of the 25 notified NAPs analyzed, only nine meet all three criteria, na-
mely Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the Uni-
ted Kingdom and – as the only EU-10 MS – Slovenia. The results at the aggre-
gate level of all NAPs – before and after taking into consideration the NAP deci-
sions of the EC – appear in Table 2. After the Commission's ruling on the first 
14 (+1) NAPs the majority of MS now meet all criteria. Due to high growth rates 
for the EU-10 MS, the only notable exception is the comparison of their permit-
ted phase 2 budgets with 2005 emissions. A comparison of the maximum a-
mount of KM companies may use to fulfil their ETS obligations with the reducti-
on requirements implied by the three criteria, entails only few reductions within 
the EU. 
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Table 2: Results for three criteria at aggregate level of 25 NAPs and 
comparison with companies’ KM limit 
 in million 
EUA
in % of VET 
2005
in million 
EUA
in % of ET-
budget phase 1
 in million 
EUA
in % of projected 
emissions
in million 
ERU-CER/a
EU-15 (15) Notified -149.1 -9.6% -111.5 -6.7% -119.7 -7.2% 286.4
(10) Accepted -176.6 -15.0% -152.9 -12.3% -150.8 -12.1% 163.3
EU-10 (10) Notified 127.9 25.8% 65.8 12.7% 67.9 13.1% 86.7
(5) Accepted 1.8 3.6% -7.0 -13.2% -20.4 -38.1% 4.1
Total (25) Notified -21.2 -1.0% -45.7 -2.1% -51.8 -2.4% 373.1
(15) Accepted -174.8 -14.2% -160.0 -12.3% -171.1 -13.2% 167.4
KM limit for 
companies
ET-budget in phase 2 compared to
VET 2005 ET-budget in phase1 Emission projections for 2010
(criterion 1) (criterion 2) (criterion 3)
 
Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on NAPs of MS, CEC 2006a, CEC 2007a, CEC 2007b, CEC 
2007c, CEC 2006b, registry data (CITL as of October 23, 2006), UNFCCC 2006 and EEA 2006 
2.3 Cost-efficiency of ET-budgets 
To examine the extent to which MS rely on the EU ETS to meet their Kyoto bur-
den-sharing targets, we examine whether the sizes of the notified ET-budgets 
are consistent with an efficient distribution of reduction efforts between trading 
and non-trading sectors and again compare our results with new budgets resul-
ting from EC requirements. From an economic perspective, the size of the bud-
gets for the ET-sector and the non-ET-sector should be determined such that 
(before international trading starts) the total abatement costs are minimized, i.e. 
that the marginal costs of the abatement measures realized in the trading and 
the non-trading sectors are equal. Thus, sectors with cheaper measures should 
contribute more reductions (relatively) to achieving a country’s emission target.  
Criterion 4: Hypothetical allocation scenario (HAS) between ET- and non 
ET-sectors for 2008-12 
To derive an indicator for the cost-efficiency of the ET-budgets, we relate the 
size of the ET-budget in the NAPs to a “hypothetical allocation scenario bet-
ween ETS and non-ETS” (HAS). The HAS represents the budget resulting for 
the trading sector (biggest parts of energy and industry) assuming that all sec-
tors contribute proportionally to achieving a country’s emission target. In this 
paper we are using a Kyoto Mechanism scenario for those MS intending to use 
KM, thereby increasing the national emission budgets (and consequently also 
the HAS). In our assessment, the NAP of a MS is considered to meet this crite-
rion if the ET-budget is not larger than the budget which corresponds to the 
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HAS, i.e. to a proportional reduction of emissions to reach the Kyoto-target.8
Figure 5 shows the differences between the actual ET-budgets and the HAS (in 
%), again comparing ET-budgets notified by MS with ET-budgets accepted by 
the EC. Before the Commission’s ruling, apart from the UK, Spain, the Czech 
Republic, and Hungary, the emission budgets for the ET-sectors in all other MS 
are – often significantly – larger than those which would result from a proportio-
nal contribution. In terms of cost-efficiency, this result insinuates that the “pie 
split” is not efficient in most countries. According to many studies (including 
Böhringer et al. 2006; Criqui and Kitous 2003; or Peterson 2006), the marginal 
abatement costs of the ET-sector are lower than the abatement costs of other 
sectors in the economy (even without considering the ETS-companies' option to 
use “cheap” credits from CDM or JI-projects to fulfil their obligation under the 
EU ETS). Thus, from a cost-efficiency perspective, the ET-sectors should actu-
ally make a higher than proportional contribution to a MS’ required emission 
reductions. 
                                            
8  For further details on the methodology applied in calculating the HAS see Rogge et al. 
2006. 
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Figure 5: ET-budget for phase 2 compared to “hypothetical allocation 
scenario” with KM (in %) 
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4- Hypothetical allocation scenario (with KM)  / ET-budget phase 2 
4- Hypothetical allocation scenario (with KM) / ET-budget phase 2  (COM decision)
 
Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on NAPs of MS, CEC 2006a, CEC 2006b, CEC 2007a, CEC 
2007b, CEC 2007c, registry data (CITL as of October 23, 2006, UNFCCC 2006 and EEA 2006 
 
The striped bars show how our assessment improves with the new, EC appro-
ved phase 2 budgets: almost all of the 14 (+1) MS are now requested to assign 
EU ETS budgets that are close to or even clearly below the HAS (only excepti-
ons are the Netherlands and Slovenia). The EU ETS sector would thus actually 
shoulder an over-proportional reduction burden compared to the rest of the e-
conomy, which – due to lower marginal abatement costs in the EU ETS sector – 
should reduce the overall abatement costs borne by society for meeting emissi-
on reduction targets. 
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3 Micro level analysis 
As in phase 1 of the EU ETS, the majority of MS again apply a two step appro-
ach to determine the quantities of EUA allocated to individual installations. 9 In 
the first step, sector budgets (SB) are determined, typically based on a combi-
nation of historical emission levels or average benchmarks, emission saving 
potentials (EF = efficiency factor), growth projections, and a compliance factor 
(CF) which ensures that the overall ET-budget is met. In the second step, the 
sector budgets are then allocated for free to individual installations (IA = instal-
lation allocation), typically based on their emissions’ share in a base period (ra-
ther than on output or capacity). Technically, most EU-15 MS apply sector-
specific compliance factors to guarantee that allocation to installations does not 
exceed sector budgets. In the simplest case, there are only two budgets: one 
for energy and one for industry. 10 Most of the new MS (e.g. Estonia, Latvia, 
Slovakia) will easily reach their Kyoto-targets and do not apply sector budgets 
or compliance factors at installation level. Next we will analyse in more detail 
the allocation rules for existing installations, for new projects (including new 
entrant reserves) and for closures, drawing primarily on arguments from eco-
nomic theory. The section also covers special provisions for CHP, early action, 
and process-related emissions. 
3.1 Allocation rules for existing and new installations 
Auctioning and windfall profits 
Economists generally prefer auctioning to conventional grandfathering (e.g. 
Cramton and Kerr 2002). In particular, under auctioning the “polluter-pays“ prin-
ciple holds so that the outcome may be perceived as “fair”. Also, auctioning off 
part of the budget right at the beginning of the trading period may also generate 
robust early price signals for the actual scarcity in the market, since participants 
base their bidding behaviour on their marginal abatement costs (and expected 
prices in the secondary market) (e.g. Schmalensee et al. 1998). Further, auction 
                                            
9  In some countries, the energy sector only includes power installations connected to the 
grid. In other MS, the energy sector also includes power installations in the industry sector. 
For simplicity we usually do not make this distinction when presenting the general results. 
10  Note that if the emission budget for a particular group of installations is fixed, then a BM 
allocation implies that the allocation to an installation is in proportion to the share of the ac-
tivity level of that installation. In particular, the allocation to an installation is independent of 
the level of the benchmark. 
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revenues could be used for other purposes, including compensation to house-
holds or companies for increased power prices, funding for R&D in energy-
efficient technologies, reducing public debt, or lowering distorting taxes, thus 
improving the efficiency of the entire economy (double dividend). 
In addition, auctioning off all allowances could avoid most, if not all, problems 
and distributional aspects which result in inefficient and complex rules in several 
MS. These aspects include accounting for early action, excess allocation at in-
stallation level 11, or the treatment of new installations and closures (see below). 
Thus, the NAPs could be much simpler, more transparent and more efficient if 
all allowances were auctioned off. Auctioning off allowances would also address 
“windfall profits”: if companies manage to pass on any additional marginal costs 
(opportunity costs) associated with emissions (i.e. price of allowances) to 
customers, extra profits (windfall profits) accrue if allowances are allocated for 
free. Whether allowances are auctioned off or allocated for free does not alter 
the opportunity costs (of additional emissions), but the outcomes in terms of the 
distribution of the scarcity rents are quite different. According to Sijm et al. 
(2006), the pass-through rates for electricity in the EU vary between 60 and 
100 %, depending on the country, market structure, demand elasticity and CO2-
price considered. Also, under (at least partially) free allocation, companies' pro-
fits in the product market (e.g. electricity) may rise if prices for EUA increase 
(above competitive prices) and if these increases can be passed on to consu-
mers in the product markets. Participating companies are better off if allowan-
ces are allocated for free, since their wealth increases by the total value of the-
se allowances. Thus a free allocation is politically more palatable which may 
explain the observed low shares of the ET-budgets that MS intend to auction off 
also in the second phase (see Annex). Although, compared to phase 1, where 
only four MS (Denmark, Hungary, Ireland and Lithuania) chose to auction off 
parts of their ET-budget, more MS (so far 9 MS) will do so in phase 2 (but no 
longer Denmark), and the shares will usually be larger but tend to be well below 
the maximum share of 10 % allowed by the ETS Directive in phase 2. In additi-
on, Italy intends to sell 5.7 % of its ET budget to ET-companies, and Germany 
plans to sell 1 million EUA p.a. on the market to cover administrative costs. To 
address windfall profits in the power sector, most of the EU-15 MS imposed a 
higher relative reduction burden on the energy sector compared to industry sec-
                                            
11  To prevent excess allocation, some MS (Austria, Germany) had included so called ex-post 
adjustments of the allocation in phase 1. Since ex-post adjustments are at odds with the 
logic of emission trading (ex-ante principle of allocation), the EC has ruled against them. 
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tors. Italy, Portugal, Sweden, the UK and (implicitly also) Germany, for example, 
determine the size of the budget for the power sector as the residual of the ET-
budget once allocation to other installations has been determined. The Nether-
lands apply an additional specific reduction factor of 0.15 to existing power in-
stallations to correct for windfall profits. 
Conventional grandfathering and benchmarking for existing installations 
Under benchmarking, allocation is based on specific emission values per unit of 
production (e.g. kg CO2/MWh electricity or t CO2/t cement clinker) for a particu-
lar group of products or installations. The actual number of allowances can be 
derived from the specific benchmark multiplied by past or predicted installation-
specific or standardized activity rates. Average benchmarks are calculated as 
the activity-weighted average of emission values for a particular group and re-
sult in a higher allocation for all companies than benchmarks based on the best-
available technology (BAT-benchmarks). A benchmarking allocation at installa-
tion level favours carbon-efficient installations over less carbon-efficient installa-
tions, since operators of the latter need to purchase missing allowances on the 
market or have fewer excess allowances. Thus, allocating allowances based on 
benchmarks may be perceived as more fair than conventional grandfathering. 
Since benchmarking to existing installations accounts for early action, it may 
lead to desired distributional effects. Differentiating benchmarks by fuels, tech-
nologies or sub-product groups softens these effects compared to benchmark 
which is uniformly applied to all installations in a group. 12  
Also, if companies can directly affect their allocation (updating), benchmarking 
leads to more efficient outcomes than conventional grandfathering (Sterner and 
Muller 2006; Cremer and Schleich 2006). For example, for installations recei-
ving fewer free allowances under benchmarking than under conventional grand-
fathering, benchmarking provides a greater incentive to substitute inefficient 
installations if closures result in a termination of allocation (see also paragraph 
on closures). The tighter the benchmark, the higher this incentive would be. Fi-
nally, benchmarking may also facilitate comparison across EU MS and may be 
seen as a first step towards harmonized allocation rules throughout the EU 
(Kruger and Pizer 2004). On the other side, benchmarking includes more strin-
                                            
12  The Netherlands, Flanders and Wallonia, where allocation is based on Covenants or volun-
tary agreements, use BAT-benchmarks for existing installations. However, as in phase 1, 
they use benchmarks to calculate the efficiency factor (i.e. difference between BAT and ac-
tual efficiency) which is used in the allocation formula (see Annex). 
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gent data requirements and the need to form benchmarking groups (see, for 
example, Radov et al. 2005). Also, as shown, for example by Cremer and 
Schleich (2006) for the German power sector, distributional effects may be high 
even if benchmarks are differentiated.  
As can be seen from the Annex, most MS allocate allowances to existing instal-
lations for free based on historical emissions. But several countries like Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Latvia, Spain, Sweden and the UK base allocation for 
some existing installations – mostly power installations – on benchmarks. The 
revised German NAP (of 13 February 2007) now also includes benchmarking 
for energy installations. Apart from France and Denmark, these countries did 
not use benchmarks to allocate EUAs to existing installations in phase 1. The 
observation that benchmarks tend to be applied to power installations supports 
the view that the electricity sector is particularly well suited to benchmarking 
since its output is fairly homogenous and it is relatively easy to assign installati-
ons to benchmarking groups. The majority of benchmarks are fuel and/or tech-
nology-specific average benchmarks rather than uniform benchmarks or BAT 
benchmarks. Exceptions include Austria, Denmark, Flanders and Wallonia in 
Belgium, where a uniform BAT-benchmark is applied for power installations, 
and Sweden, where allocation for basic oxygen steel furnaces is based on an 
EU-wide average benchmark. In Austria, the BAT-benchmark is based on gas, 
but deficit and excess allocation (relative to historic emissions) are capped.  
Allocation rules for new projects 
The logic of emission trading requires that all allowances for new projects be 
purchased at market prices, since investment decisions can then be based on 
the full social costs (i.e. private costs plus environmental cost). As already poin-
ted out by Spulber (1985), allocating allowances for free to new projects a-
mounts to subsidizing investments (and output), and thus increases – ceteris 
paribus – the total costs to society of achieving climate targets. Having to buy 
allowances for new projects on the secondary market or at an auction would 
provide strong monetary incentives to implement energy-efficient, low-carbon 
technologies since these technologies require the purchase of fewer allowan-
ces. 13
                                            
13  However, under the current closure rules, which essentially provide an output subsidy to 
incumbent installations (see below), free allocation to new entrants may be considered sec-
ond best (Åhman and Holmgren 2006). 
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As in phase 1, in phase 2, all MS establish a New Entrant Reserve to allocate 
allowances to new projects (i.e. new installations and capacity extensions of 
existing installations) for free, typically on a first-come-first-served basis. The 
reserves vary substantially in size, ranging from circa 1 % of the ET-budget in 
Austria to approximately 45 % in Latvia.14 Only non-CHP plants in the Swedish 
power sector have to buy all their allowances on the market. As in phase 1, gra-
tis allocation in most MS is typically based on BAT-values for individual installa-
tions or on BAT-benchmarks for homogenous products (or technologies). BAT-
benchmarks are common in the energy sector, where they tend to be differenti-
ated by fuel inputs. So far only Denmark, Luxembourg, Sweden, Flanders and 
Wallonia in Belgium and the UK are applying uniform benchmarks. If BAT-
benchmarks are used for new projects in industry sectors, they tend to be tech-
nology-specific, and often assume gas as the fuel input (e.g. Latvia, UK). Some-
times, product groups are further split into sub-groups (e.g. different types of 
tiles or glass in Germany). However, uniform benchmarks would create stronger 
incentives to invest in the most efficient technology within a given product 
group, independent of the level of the benchmark. Any differentiation (e.g. by 
fuels, processes, or by utilization rates) implies additional subsidization of parti-
cular installations and further reduces the cost-saving potential of the EU ETS 
because innovation incentives are limited to the sub-groups. Further, as Åhman 
and Holmgren (2006) point out, applying the BAT-benchmark rules across MS 
to an exemplary power plant would result in substantial differences in terms of 
allocation. To a large extent, these differences are the result of differences in 
the BAT-values and activity rates applied (projected output, standardized load 
factors). To limit such differences within a country, Luxemburg and the UK for 
example, and – originally – also Germany, apply the same activity rates for allo-
cation to all power installations (connected to the grid) – however the figures 
across countries differ substantially: 6500 hours in Luxembourg and 5600 hours 
in the UK. 15 In addition, there are differences in the compliance factors applied 
to new projects across MS (e.g. Wallonia, Spain, UK), if these are applied at all 
to new projects.  
                                            
14  As in phase 1 Germany again plans to replenish its NER reserve if it turns out to be too 
small. An independent agency will then purchase a sufficient amount of allowances on the 
market so that all new entrants may receive allowances for free; part of the reserve in the 
third trading period will be earmarked to finance the agency. A similar set-up exists in 
Austria, Lithuania and Luxembourg. 
15  The revised German NAP (of 13 February 2007) now differentiates between 7500 hours for 
new gas and coal-fired power plants, and – this is new – 8250 hours for lignite-fired plants. 
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Allocation rules for closures 
From an economic perspective, closures should not alter the allocation (upda-
ting). By contrast, if allocation is terminated after a closure, companies do not 
properly account for the opportunity costs, old plants may continue to be opera-
ted too long and new investments may be postponed (Spulber 1985, Åhman et 
al. 2007).Stopping allocation for closures corresponds to an output subsidy, and 
consequently there will be too many companies in the market. As is typically the 
case in other cap-and-trade systems (e.g. Ellerman et al. 2003), operators 
should continue to receive the intended quantity of allowances. By contrast, as 
already in phase 1, in phase 2 of the EU ETS most MS decided to end the dist-
ribution of allowances with the year an installation closes.  
For phase 2, Cyprus, Flanders and Malta, among others, joined Greece, Hun-
gary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, the UK and – originally – also 
Germany16, which continue to include so-called transfer rules. To provide addi-
tional incentives for investments, a transfer rule allows the allocated allowances 
from a closed installation to be reassigned to a new installation.  
At least to some extent the inefficient closure rules are the consequence of the 
ET Directive, which requires that allowances can only be allocated to installati-
ons which operate under a permit to emit greenhouse gases (Article 11 in com-
bination with Article 4, CEC 2004b). Thus, if closed installations cease to adhe-
re to the permit or no longer hold a permit to emit GHG, allowances may no 
longer be allocated to that installation. Technically, the ETS Directive would ha-
ve allowed independent permits for operation and for GHG emissions. Then, a 
closure would not have resulted in a loss of the permit to emit GHG and alloca-
tion could have continued. In practice, however, MS decided to link existing o-
perating permits with the permit to emit GHG. In some MS, a tight schedule for 
implementing the ETS Directive in phase 1 may have prevented the required 
changes in legislation. Possibly more importantly, MS may have been concer-
ned that operators might shutdown their installations, keep the allocation, and 
open a new plant in another country. 
Special provisions for CHP, early action and process-related emissions 
Provisions for CHP plants, early action or process-related emissions are neither 
required by the Directive nor do they affect the economic efficiency of the EU 
                                            
16  The revised German NAP (of 13 February 2007) no longer includes such a transfer rule. 
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ETS. Instead, they may be justified for distributional reasons and to facilitate 
political acceptance of the system. However, there are no clear-cut rules by 
which installations "worthy" of these special provisions can be defined and the 
rules implemented vary substantially across MS.  
To support existing CHP, some MS apply a different compliance factor (e.g. 
Belgium, Greece, Sweden and the UK) or a bonus (e.g. Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Lithuania), exclude CHP from special cuts which account for windfall pro-
fits (e.g. the Netherlands), provide special early action provisions for CHP (e.g. 
Estonia) or use a “double benchmark” for heat and electricity (e.g. Germany, 
Italy, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia). Other MS (e.g. Belgium, Ireland, Lithuania and 
Luxembourg) use such double benchmarks for new CHP plants only. Some MS 
(e.g. the UK, Wallonia and Flanders in Belgium) apply a less stringent compli-
ance factor to new CHP installations. Finally, some MS which allocate gratis 
allowances to new projects on a first-come-first-served basis have established a 
special reserve for new CHP plants only (e.g. UK, Ireland). Compared to phase 
1, the number and types of rules to compensate existing CHP have increased.  
In phase 1, several MS (e.g. Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary) apply a spe-
cial bonus or a higher compliance factor to directly compensate for early ac-
tion. 17 Numerous MS accounted for early action in a more indirect way by using 
longer or earlier base periods (e.g. Ireland, Luxembourg and Slovenia), applying 
efficiency factors (e.g. Netherlands, Italy) or benchmarks (Belgium, UK). In pha-
se 2, none of the EU-15 MS accounts for any new early action directly. Only 
some of the new MS (Estonia and Poland) have kept special early action rules 
and Lithuania has even introduced a special early action bonus although it did 
not directly account for early action in phase 1.  
Since at least in the short term, the reduction of process-related emissions is 
believed to be either very expensive or technically not feasible for many applica-
tions, some MS have introduced special provisions for installations emitting a 
higher proportion of process-related CO2 (e.g. lime, cement clinker, steel, glass) 
in phase 1. These provisions are applied either directly at the level of individual 
installations via less stringent compliance factors (e.g. Germany), or indirectly at 
the level of sectors (e.g. France, UK). Most countries continue their special 
treatment of process-related emissions in phase 2 in the same way as before. 
                                            
17  Allocating allowances based on a recent base period implies that companies which in-
vested in reductions prior to this period (early action) will receive fewer allowances than 
those which did not invest. 
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Only Germany has switched from an installation-level to a sector-level appro-
ach. Luxembourg now applies a uniform CF for all installations and no longer 
uses a special CF for process-related emissions. The Netherlands and Lithua-
nia have introduced new, special rules for process-related emissions. 
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4 Conclusions 
Our analysis of the notified NAPs for phase 2 suggests that, for many NAPs, 
there is ample potential for improvement in terms of environmental effective-
ness and economic efficiency.  
In terms of environmental effectiveness, our analyses on the stringency of the 
(adjusted) ET-budgets for the 25 NAPs included in this paper suggest that, on 
average, the ET-budgets in phase 2 are only about 1% lower than historical e-
missions in 2005, and 2.1 % lower than the budgets in phase 1 (2005-2007) as 
well as 2.4 % lower than projected emissions in 2010. Thus, the intended allo-
cation for the ET-sector in 2008-12 would not require significant reductions. The 
analyses also indicate a dichotomy between old and new MS. While on avera-
ge, the EU-15 MS intend to reduce emissions by about 9.6 % compared to VET 
2005 data, and ca. -6.7 % and -7.2 % for the other two criteria, the implied ave-
rage surplus of allowances in the new MS is substantial, ranging from 25.8 % 
when compared to VET 2005 data and approx. 12.7 % above phase 1 budgets 
and ca. 13.1 % higher than projections. In addition, several governments of EU-
15 MS plan to purchase credits from Kyoto Mechanisms corresponding to about 
109 MtCO2e/a. Assuming a price of 15 €/t CO2e, these purchases correspond to 
1.635 billion € p.a. which would have to be financed by the federal budgets. In 
these MS, the credits from KM contribute substantially to meeting the Burden-
Sharing targets, and easing the reduction burden for installations covered by 
the ETS Directive. Since companies are also allowed a generous use of KM in 
most MS, the actual requirements for domestic reductions are low. From the 
perspective of cost-efficiency we find that, with the possible exception of the UK 
and Spain, the non-trading sectors have to bear a disproportionately high share 
of the reduction efforts in all EU-15 MS. Thus, while the ETS enables the tra-
ding sector to cost-efficiently achieve its ET-budget, the economy as a whole 
pays a premium for giving a more generous share of the Kyoto budget to the 
ET-sector rather than to those sectors where emission reductions cost more.  
When taking into account the first NAP decisions of the Commission which re-
quired a significant downward adjustment of ET-budgets by almost 7 %, our 
stringency criteria are fulfilled in almost all instances. Therefore, the EC's re-
quested emission budget reductions for the first 14 (15) national allocation plans 
is a significant and important step towards a more effective and efficient EU 
ETS. Without these ET-budget cuts, the price for EUA, innovation incentives for 
low-carbon technologies, and demand for ERUs and CERs by companies would 
have all expected to be low as well. But even with these reductions of the EU 
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ETS budgets, our analysis shows that domestic reduction requirements remain 
limited as companies and governments can make use of substantial amounts of 
KM. 
Even though the Directive, which sets the general rules for allocation in phase 1 
and phase 2, remained unchanged, MS were able to alter allocation rules ac-
ross phases within the constraints of the Directive. Based on the 25 NAPs inc-
luded in this survey, a comparison of the allocation rules between phases 1 and 
2 yields mixed results in terms of increased harmonisation and improved effi-
ciency. A general path dependency of allocation rules may be observed, i.e. MS 
tend to keep the allocation concepts and methodologies applied in phase 1. 
Consequently, there is only little progress in the implementation of more effi-
cient and more harmonized rules across MS. As a result of the NAP guidance 
for phase 2 though, the types of installations covered in almost all MS have 
been harmonised and ex-post adjustments have been banned. Areas of harmo-
nisation and improved efficiency which were not triggered by EC rules or guide-
lines include a (slight) increase in auctioning or the use of benchmarks for e-
xisting and new energy installations, in particular in the power sector in EU-15 
MS. Even though the share of allowances to be auctioned off in phase 2 will be 
higher than in phase 1, it still falls considerably short of the maximum level of 
10 % allowed by the Directive. Thus, a future Directive should set a high mini-
mum level rather than a low maximum level for the auction share. Such a rule 
would also limit the discretionary power of the MSs as well as the lobbying in-
centives for companies.   
Basing allocation to new projects on benchmarks and standard utilization rates 
to new projects improves efficiency and transparency compared to – as is still 
the case primarily in new MS – using installation-specific emission values to-
gether with projected activity rates for which operators have an incentive to pre-
dict "optimistic" data. But differentiated benchmarks or activity rates for new 
technologies amount to technology- or fuel-specific subsidies, which preserve 
existing production structures and distort dynamic innovation incentives. They 
run counter to the logic of emission trading systems, where market prices and 
flexibility are supposed to guide investment decisions rather than subsidies for 
particular types of installations. In Denmark e.g. over-dimensional boilers were 
the result of a capacity-based allocation rule. Harmonization of the allocation 
rules for new projects aiming at levelling the playing field across MS would have 
to include not only benchmarks, but also activity rates and compliance factors. 
Naturally, this would still leave the differences in other, potentially more rele-
vant, investment criteria across MS. Another area of improved harmonisation 
24 EU Emission Trading – Better Job Second Time Around? 
concerns the increased use of transfer rules in the case of closures, but the 
transfer terms vary across MS.  
Terminating allocation after closure and allocating free allowances to new pro-
jects in all MS are examples where implicit harmonisation has prevailed, but the 
outcome is not economically efficient. In particular, since MS competing for new 
investments may have an incentive to use generous allocation rules to attract 
new projects, a change in the ETS Directive seems indispensable to solve this 
potential 'prisoner's dilemma' situation. This may also prevent MS to use the 
NER for strategic purposes, such as the reserve replenishment mechanism, 
which shift economic costs into the future.   
Compared to phase 1, some MS have managed to reduce the complexity of the 
allocation rules. This is especially true for Germany, where allocation in phase 1 
was based on almost 60 different (combination of) rules. Several MS have also 
facilitated or abandoned special provisions for early action, process-related e-
missions or CHP installations. Switching from installation-specific to indirect 
provisions at the sector level or as part of the general allocation rules (like 
benchmarking) has also improved transparency and is likely to lower transacti-
on costs. Still, a wide range of criteria to determine the “worthiness” of special 
provisions continues to be used across MS. Since in phase 2, political accep-
tance should play a smaller role than in phase 1 the introduction of new special 
allocation rules in phase 2 in several new MS is remarkable.  
To conclude, the decisions by the EC on the first 14 NAPs clearly improved ef-
fectiveness and economic efficiency and acted as a signal to the international 
carbon market community. They also have repercussions for other carbon mar-
kets and emission trading schemes being set up around the world, for invest-
ments and technology transfer through JI and CDM, as well as for post 2012 
international climate policy negotiations. 
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Glossary 
CCGT Combined Gas Cycle Turbines 
CDM Clean Development Mechanism 
CHP Combined Heat and Power 
CITL Community Independent Transaction Log 
EC European Commission 
ET Emissions Trading 
EU European Union 
EUA  EU Allowance 
EU ETS EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
HAS Hypothetical Allocation Scenario 
JI Joint Implementation 
KM Kyoto-Mechanisms 
MS Member State of European Union 
NAP National Allocation Plan 
NER New Entrant Reserve 
VET Verified Emissions Table 
30 EU Emission Trading – Better Job Second Time Around? 
 
 
 
Annex - EU Emission Trading – Better Job Second Time Around? 31 
 
Annex:  Summary table of National Allocation Plans for 
phase 2 
 
 
Auction 
Share of ET-
budget incl. 
reserve: 
Phase 2 (1) 
Allocation to existing installations  
Two steps / one step; 1st step = sector budget (SB) 
2nd step = Individual allocation (IA)   
a) Energy  b) Non-energy  c) special provisions CHP 
Allocation to new installations  
a) Energy 
b) Non-energy   
c) special provisions CHP 
AT 1.22% (0%) Two steps a) b) SB = emissions base period (2002-2005) * 
growth rate*sectoral reduction potential*CF (sector-specific) 
a) IA = production (2002-2005) * uniform BAT-benchmark 
for heat and electricity * CF  
b) IA = emissions (2002-2005) * reduction potential (incl. 
process emissions = 1, CHP, fuel, BAT) * CF (sector-
specif.) 
c) if energy savings >10% or supply to public district heating 
network technological potential reduced  
a) b) based on  
authorised capacity,  
average load factor from existing installa-
tions,  
projected load factor for installations, 
installation-based BAT 
BE-
B 
 0% (0%) a) IA =  average emissions in 2002-2005 CF=1   
b) IA = emissions 2005 * growth factor * individual reduction 
potential * CHP potential factor   
c) no  
a) b) based on projected emissions  c) 
special CHP New Entrants Reserve           
BE-
F 
 0.5% (0%) a) IA = Installed capacity * technology-specific load factor * 
uniform BAT benchmark (359 g/kWh)   
b) if installation part of covenant: IA = covenant agreement 
(“world top by 2012”); if installation not part of covenant: 
CF=0.85 (diminished by 0.008 each year)   
c) CF=1  
a) based on installed capacity * technol-
ogy-specific load factor * uniform bench-
mark (359 g/kWh)   
b) if installation part of covenant:    
IA= covenant agreement (“world top by 
2012”); if Installation not part of covenant: 
CF=0.85 (diminished by 0.008 each year)  
BE-
W 
 0% (0%) a) IA = installed capacity * technology-specific load factor * 
uniform BAT benchmark (400 g/kWh) * CF (=0.839) (= 
value of 336 g/kWh)   
b) IA = emissions (1 yr. out of 1999 to 2002) * projected 
growth * efficiency factor (individually agreed or assessed); 
CF=0.97, if (VET2005 - allocation) > 10% , CF=1 otherwise  
c) IA = average emissions 2000-2004; CF=1 
a) IA = installed capacity * technology-
specific load factor * uniform BAT bench-
mark (400 g/kWh )*CF(=0.839)  
(= value of 336 g/kWh) 
b) on individual BAT and projected output  
c) CF=1  
CY 0 % (0%) a) IA= BAU projection (future demand based on data from 
1995-2005) * energy efficiency and renewables potential 
b) (only cement and ceramics) IA= emission projections 
including efficiency improvements (future production based 
on historic data: cement: 1998-2005: ceramics: 2001-2005) 
based on rules to be developed. 
CZ 0% (0%) Tow steps  
a) b) SB = emissions (1999-2001 and 2005) * growth factor 
IA = installation’s share of emissions in 1999-2001 (two 
highest yrs.) + if applicable: Early Action bonus and/or CHP 
bonus and/or adjustment for district heating  
c) CHP bonus 
a) b) IA = projected emissions (not more 
than needed) 
DE  0% (0%) Two steps (implicit) 
a) IA: based on fuel-specific BAT-benchmarks*average 
capacity use (2000-2005); if installed before 2003, IA: BAT-
BM * (standardized load factors);  
+ CF if ET-budget too small; no CF if installation meets 
BAT;  
b) IA= Average emissions 2000-2005 * CF (=0.9875)   
c) double benchmark *average capacity use (2002-2005);  
a) based on fuel-specific BAT-BM and 
standardized load factors 
b) homogenous products (e.g. cement, 
glass, tiles): standardized load factors and 
BAT-BM (differentiated by sub-product 
groups or technologies);  
other installations: BAT  
c) double benchmark  
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Auction 
Share of ET-
budget incl. 
reserve: 
Phase 2 (1) 
Allocation to existing installations  
Two steps / one step; 1st step = sector budget (SB) 
2nd step = Individual allocation (IA)   
a) Energy  b) Non-energy  c) special provisions CHP 
Allocation to new installations  
a) Energy 
b) Non-energy   
c) special provisions CHP 
DK 0% (5%) a) IA = fossil power production (1998-2004 or 2004 if emis-
sions for 2004> average for 1998-2004) * uniform BM 
(0.388 tCO2/MWh) * (includes CF: electricity: 0.57)  
IA heat = similar as b) 
b) IA (incl. offshore) = combustion emissions (1998-2004 or 
2004 if 2004 > average 1998-2004) * CF (0.87) + process 
emissions (1998-2004 or 2004 if 2004 > average 1998-
2004) * CF (0.98) 
c) based on a) and b) and distribution between heat and 
electricity is based on 125 % thermal efficiency 
a) if capacity expansions > 10 MW and full 
load hours > 1000h/a  
IA electricity = capacity * load factor (if 
2000-2999 h/a CF = 2/3; if 1000-1999 h/a 
CF = 1/3) * BAT-BM (1185 tCO2/MW) 
IA heat = cap.*BAT-BM (100 tCO2/MW) 
b) capacity * uniform BAT-BM * CF (same 
as existing installations) 
BAT-benchmarks have been reduced 
compared to NAP 1, BM includes as-
sumed load factor 
c) double benchmark: electricity (1185 
tCO2/MW) and heat (305 tCO2/MW)  
EE  0% (0%)    a) b) IA = emissions 1995-2005 (district heating) or 2000-
2005 (electricity and industry) * growth factor (= 6.5% for 
electricity/3% for district heating and industry) - no CF   
c) increase in CHP rewarded as early action 
a) no information on allocation method   
b) Estonian BAT benchmarks    
c) no 
ES   0% (0%) a) IA = installation capacity * load factor * BAT benchmark 
(technology specific) * CF (=0.746)   
b) Two steps: SB = projected output 2010 * average 
benchmarks (2005) * efficiency factor; 
IA = avg. specific emissions * output (2 yrs from 2000-2005) 
* install.-specific CF   
c) projected emissions (based on VET 2005) 
a) same rules as for existing installations  
b) BAT BM * projected output 2008-12    
c) projected emissions  
FI  0% (0%) a) IA = fuel consumption (2000-2003) [peak load and re-
serve capacity (1998-2002)] * installation-specific BM * CF 
(condensing power: 0.33 / peak load and reserve capacity: 
0.9 / district heating: 0.8) 
b) IA = process emissions*CF (0.95) + combustion emiss. 
(including industrial power prod..) (1998-2002) * CF (0.9) 
c) IA = emissions (1998-2002) * CF (0.8); CF for CHP in 
industry is 0.9 
a) b) c) IA = fuel input (MJ) * sector spe-
cific load factor * fuel specific emissions 
factor (for process emissions = average 
factor of existing installations applied) * 
CF(same as for existing installations) 
FR  0% (0%)  Two steps  
a) b) SB: production (2004/2005) * growth rate * average 
benchmark (2004/2005)*reduction potential * CF (=0.9729);  
IA: installation’s share of emissions in BP (varying: 1996 to 
2005, sometimes one single year)   
c) no     
a) b) based on BAT benchmarks 
(gas)*projected output; list of benchmarks 
to be set up   
c) no   
 
GR  0% (0%) Two steps  
a) b) SB = projected emissions * CF (=0.89 for combus-
tion/=1.0 for CHP and process emissions/=0.91 to 0.99 for 
industry)   
IA =  average emissions 2000-2004 (without lowest year) * 
sector-specific CF (<1); “Fuel coefficient” used for other 
combustion, paper and cardboards, lime and ceramics; 
special rules for steel and cement   
c) CF=1 
a) b) capacity * load factor * specific 
emission factor * sector specific CF for 
existing installations (if specific emission 
factor is BAT, CF=1)   
c) CF=1 and  special CHP NER  
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Auction 
Share of ET-
budget incl. 
reserve: 
Phase 2 (1) 
Allocation to existing installations  
Two steps / one step; 1st step = sector budget (SB) 
2nd step = Individual allocation (IA)   
a) Energy  b) Non-energy  c) special provisions CHP 
Allocation to new installations  
a) Energy 
b) Non-energy   
c) special provisions CHP 
HU 4.3 % (2.5%) Two steps 
a) b) SB = sector specific output projections (varying meth-
odologies) * sector specific reduction potential (fuel switch 
and BAU efficiency improvement) 
a) IA = share of sector emissions based on heat and elec-
tricity output (2004-2006) * average emissions factor of fuel 
mix in 2005 * inverse BAT efficiency (output/input fuel in %) 
* 1.05 if CHP + emissions from SO2 scrubbers in 2005 + 
bonus for district heat production with domestic fuel 
b) IA = Share of sector emissions (2005); exceptions for 
sugar, cement, lime, glass and brick industry 
c) CHP factor of 1.05 + bonus for production of district heat 
with domestic fuel 
a) c) expected production (based on 
previous operation) * fuel specific BAT BM 
(coal and lignite minimum of 17.8 % 
biomass is assumed) 
b) expected production (based on previ-
ous operation) * BAT BM (gas) 
IE  0.5% 0.75%) Two steps  
a) b) SB = [share of sector emissions 2003 * CF (=0.9 for 
energy / =1 for industry)* 0.95 (auction factor)] minus sector 
specific allocation for New Entrants  
a) b) IA = share of emissions (2003-2004) * total SB  
c) electricity part: allowances from energy budget based on 
CCGT BAT-benchmark (gas) 
a) b) based on  BAT (differentiated by fuel 
and technology)* installation specific 
projected emissions (capped at 88% of 
projected emissions) 
c) specific reserve, double benchmark   
IT 0 % but 5.7% 
or 12Mt/a will 
be sold at 
fixed price 
(0%) 
Two steps  
a) b) SB= average allocation 2005-07 (additional reductions 
for energy, steel, refining) 
a) IA = output 2005 * fuel - & technology-specific BAT BM * 
trend factor * CF (=0.9897); trend factor = energy policy e.g. 
renewables (2008 = 1) 
b) IA = allocation 2007 (1 + 0.03 * individual efficiency 
factor + 0.03* individ. growth factor) * CF: CF sector-
specific 
c) CHP similar to a) but double benchmark (heat = 
350 g/kWh) * 0.85 (energy savings)  
a) capacity * load factor * fuel- and tech-
nology-specific BM (same as for incum-
bents)  
b) output projections or capacity and 
expected use * BAT benchmark (to be 
defined)   
c) double benchmark * 0.85 (energy 
savings) 
LT  2.7% (1.5%) Two steps  
a) b) SB = average emissions (2002-2005)* projected 
growth * efficiency factor (=0.9 for energy/=0.9 to 1.0 for 
industry) * 0.95 (auction factor); refineries: emissions in-
crease due to legislation by 1.153  
IA = Share of SB based on: 2 * fuel consumption in toe 
(2002-2005) * 0.5 tCO2/toe + if applicable: process-related 
emissions + 2 *early action bonus + 2 * CHP bonus    
c) double benchmark 
a) b) based on product-specific BM and 
standardized load factors   
c) double benchmark   
LU  5% (0%) a) b) IA= average emissions (3 yrs. from 2002-2005) * 
growth factor * CF (=0.991)  
c) no  
a) b) based on uniform BAT BM and 
standardized load factors   
c) double benchmark    
LV   0% (0%) a) b) IA = average output in sector-specific BP (varies 
between 2001 and 2006) * (fuel-and product-specific 
benchmarks) * growth factor* CF (= 0.98) 
c) double benchmark 
a) b) based on projected output * fuel- and 
product-specific BM*efficiency factor (for 
energy) 
c) double benchmark   
MT  0% (0%) a) IA = BAU projections * energy efficiency potential and 
planned contribution from renewables  
b) c) no installations 
a) b) capacity * planned load factor * fuel 
specific BAT-Benchmark 
c) no 
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Auction 
Share of ET-
budget incl. 
reserve: 
Phase 2 (1) 
Allocation to existing installations  
Two steps / one step; 1st step = sector budget (SB) 
2nd step = Individual allocation (IA)   
a) Energy  b) Non-energy  c) special provisions CHP 
Allocation to new installations  
a) Energy 
b) Non-energy   
c) special provisions CHP 
NL  4% (0%) a) IA = average emissions (3 yr. from 2000-2005) * growth 
factor * efficiency factor * CF(=0.73) *efficiency factor (cove-
nant-based) - CF includes 0.15 cut for windfall profits)   
b) IA= emissions (3 yrs. from 2000-2005) * growth factor 
(1.7) * efficiency factor * CF (=0.87 combustion emissions 
/=0.92 for process emissions)   
c) efficiency benchmark, no CF for small CHP 
a) b) based on BAT BM (covenant) * 
projected output (capped at 90%)   
PL  1% (0%) Two steps+  
a) b) SB = output 2005 * growth rate * sector average 
benchmarks (2005) * efficiency factor  
a) IA= projected output * fuel specific benchmarks, account-
ing for SO2  
b) IA= similar to SB and projected output agreed with asso-
ciations + CHP and early action bonus   
c) fuel-specific double benchmark  
a) b) based on -BAT-BM* projected output  
c) double BM   
d) installations which fall under Directive, 
but are not included in NAP 2 
PT 0% (0%) a) Tow steps  
SB = ET-budget – allocation for industry and CCGT  
IA = installations share of emissions (3 yrs. from 2000-2004 
or if growth > 20% 2 yrs. from 2002-2004); for CCGT use 
projected emissions 
b) IA = heat production (3 yrs. from 2000-2004 or if growth 
> 20% 2 yrs. from 2002-2004) * emissions factor (max. 
emissions factor: [installation BM + sector BM ]/2 or min. 
emissions factor in case high biomass use) + process 
emissions (3 yrs. from 2000-2004 or if growth > 20% 2 yrs. 
from 2002-2004), for steel and refinery use projections 
c) indirectly through max. emission factor 
a) b) c) installed capacity * sub-sector 
technology and fuel specific load factor * 
uniform BM (BAT in Portugal see 
www.iambiente.pt) 
SE  0% (0%) a) IA= avg. emissions in (1998 – 2001) * CF (=0.3 to 0.4) 
b) all, except BOF-steel: IA= emissions in (1998-2001) * 
growth in process-related emissions * CF(=1);  BOF-steel: 
projected output * EU avg. benchmark (2005)   
c) CF=1  
a) c)  free allocation only to highly-efficient 
CHP, based on uniform average bench-
mark (from 464 Swedish installations 
2000-2004) and installation-specific pro-
jected output   
b) based on BAT and installation-specific 
projected output  
SI 0% (0%) Two steps 
a) b) c) SB = projected emissions form ”with measures 
scenario” for 4 categories (thermal power plants and ther-
mal power & district heating plants (CHP and CCGT )/ 
district heating plants / industry/ process emissions) 
a) CHP and CCGT: IA = grandfathering factor * share of 
emissions (2002-2005) of sub-sector budget + BM-factor * 
fuel- and technology-specific BAT (follows BREF for exist-
ing LCP; grandfathering factor: 1.0 in 2008-2010, 0.7 in 
2011 and 0.5 in 2012.  
peak and reserve capacity: projected emissions * CF(=0.88) 
b) (incl. industrial CHP) IA= process emissions (2002-2005) 
*CF(=1.02) + [0.7 * combustion emissions (2002-2005) + 
0.3 * fuel specific BM + if applicable, CHP-bonus] * CF (= 
0.945) 
if IA > projected emissions different formula used 
c) double BM for a) and CHP bonus (=0,1 t/MWhe) for b) 
a) b) IA = projected output * fuel- and 
technology-specific BAT-BM * CF (0.9) + 
projected output * process BAT (individual 
assessment) 
Max. number of EUAs p.a. per new en-
trant = 14.000.  
a) heat (boiler): IA= capacity installed * 
projected load factor (max. 4000 h/a) * 
uniform BM (200 g /kWh) *CF (=0.9) 
c) no upper limit of allocation and double 
benchmark (heat: 200 g/kWh ; elec.: 350 
g/kWh) 
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Auction 
Share of ET-
budget incl. 
reserve: 
Phase 2 (1) 
Allocation to existing installations  
Two steps / one step; 1st step = sector budget (SB) 
2nd step = Individual allocation (IA)   
a) Energy  b) Non-energy  c) special provisions CHP 
Allocation to new installations  
a) Energy 
b) Non-energy   
c) special provisions CHP 
SK  0% (0%) a) IA Thermal: avg. emissions in 1998-2003 (or 2005, if 
higher) * growth of apartment stock (=1.004); 
IA: Electric and thermal: projected energy output * emis-
sions / output (1998 – 2003)   
b) large emitters: negotiated; small emitters: emissions 
(1998 – 2005) * sector-specific growth rates 
c) no 
a) b) based on projected emissions or 
BAT (fuel- and technology-specific but not 
specified any further in NAP) 
c) no 
UK  7% (0%) Two steps 
a) SB = (total ET budget – industry allocation) * CF(=0.7); 
IA= capacity * standardized load factor (2000-2003) * tech-
nology- and fuel-based benchmark  
b) SB = proj. emiss. incl. growth and reduct. potential: CF=1 
IA= installation’s share emissions in 3 yrs. out of 2000-2003  
c) separate “Good Quality CHP Sector” 
a) based on uniform BM (CCGT) * stan-
dardized load factor * CF (=0.7) 
b) based on uniform benchmark (gas - if  
applicable) * standardized load factor * CF 
(=0.9 boilers and generators/= 0.95 other) 
c) see a) CF=1 
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